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The European Commission and Fiscal Governance Reform:  
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Abstract  
 
The intensification of the financial and economic crisis in Europe has 
added a new impetus into the debate over the possibilities for securing 
supranational fiscal integration within the Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU). Since the literature on the European Union’s (EU) response to the 
crisis is dominated by the study of intergovernmental politics, this article 
considers the previously neglected role of the Commission. A framing 
analysis of the Commission’s crisis discourse is operationalised here, 
which is supplemented by interviews with senior officials located in DG 
ECFIN during key phases of the crisis. It is found that a supranational 
reform agenda was never internalised by the Commission. Instead, the 
Commission acted strategically by framing the crisis around 
intergovernmental fiscal discipline. These findings suggest that, in line with 
the ‘new intergovernmentalist’ thesis, supranational institutions themselves 
may not be as ‘hard-wired’ towards supranationalism as is often assumed. 
 
 
This article considers the Commission’s response to the financial and economic crisis, and 
the role of supranationality in the post-crisis European Union (EU) more generally. During 
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this period, the focus of political scientists has often remained confined to analysing the 
evolution of decision-making within the various intergovernmental forums, including the 
European Council, ECOFIN Council and the more informal Eurogroup setting. Indeed, the 
EU’s reaction to the crisis is one of the major case studies that support ‘new 
intergovernmentalism’ (Hodson 2011; Bickerton et al. 2015; 2015a). This theoretical 
approach argues that intergovernmental integration is the new normal in post-Maastricht 
Europe, with the supranational ‘community method’ in decline.  The implication is that the 
Commission has been weakened as an actor in terms of its agenda-setting power. However, in 
terms of resources, the Commission is still a site of considerable expertise and technical 
knowledge, which is not inconsequential in EMU matters. Moreover, owing to a range of 
powers bestowed on it by the treaties, it is reasonable to expect that it can still act 
opportunistically and strategically to influence the policy agenda (Rhinard 2010:26). Finally, 
it is also notable that many of the major legislative initiatives pursued in response to the crisis 
have actually worked to strengthen the executive powers of the Commission over economic 
governance (Bauer and Becker 2014).  
 
The focus of this article is on EU fiscal governance where it is possible to identify two 
distinct reform models: intergovernmental and supranational. This article takes seriously the 
central role of ideas in shaping EMU (Mcnamara 1998; Verdun 2002). The main theoretical 
framework employed is discursive institutionalism, which considers the explanatory power of 
ideas and the interactive processes of discourse in an institutional context (Schmidt, 2008; 
2010) i . It is applied through an in-depth framing analysis of the Commission’s crisis 
discourse (Goffman 1974), which is supplemented by interviews with senior officials located 
in DG ECFIN and other key institutions involved in crisis decision-making. As well as 
linking individual policy frames to the different integration scenarios provided, the broader 
4 
 
role of economic ideologies in determining preferences for EMU reform is also emphasised. 
Finally, the dominant framing devices being drawn upon by the Commission in response to 
the crisis will be placed in historical context and explored in terms of the wider interplay of 
ideas.  
 
Theoretical and methodological Framework 
 
The Commission’s role during the recent financial and economic crisis can be understood in 
the context of broad theories of European integration. From a certain vantage point, the 
financial and economic crisis would seem to exemplify the classic neo-functionalist dynamic 
of European Integration: a state of dynamic disequilibrium (in this case the asymmetries of 
the European political and economic system) leads to ‘spillovers’ and a gradual transfer of 
powers to the central level (Haas 1968; Rosamond 2005). However, as discussed in the 
introduction, the institutional response to the crisis is generally seen to have consolidated the 
intergovernmental element of the EU, with the European Council, ECOFIN Council and the 
Eurogroup providing crisis management and setting the agenda for reform. Bickerton et al. 
(2015; 2015a) coined the phrase ‘new intergovernmentalism’ in order to explain these 
dynamics. 
 
New intergovernmentalism argues that the classic ‘community method’ of supranational-led 
integration as enshrined in European law has not been obtained since the era of Maastricht 
(see Hodson 2011; Bickerton et al. 2015; 2015a). Instead, increases in EU powers since this 
date are understood as being led by intergovernmental processes and managed by 
decentralised policy-coordination or de novo institutions separate from the core supranational 
EU institutions, i.e. the Commission, the European Court of Justice and the European 
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Parliament (Bickerton et al. 2015). Notably, the empirical focus of new intergovernmentalism 
on more informal governance and on processes of ‘deliberation’ and ‘consensus building’ 
also means the approach is more open to focussing on the content of ideas and discursive 
interactions. As already noted, one consequence of the rise of the new intergovernmentalism 
in the post-Maastricht EU is the implied weakening of the Commission as an institutional 
actor. Moreover, Bickerton et al. (2015:712) argues that, far from resisting this shift towards 
more intergovernmental modes of governance, supranational institutions such as the 
Commission have actually been complicit with this: ‘Supranational institutions are not hard-
wired to seek ever-closer union’. Rather, they are understood as acting ‘strategically’ in 
accordance with their environment (Bickerton et al. 2015:712). This article seeks to test these 
hypotheses through a framing analysis of the Commission’s discourses formulated in 
response to the intensification of the financial and economic crisis in Europe. 
 
The main theoretical framework guiding the analysis is discursive institutionalism, which 
focuses on the role of ideology and discursive interactions in bringing about potential change 
(or continuality as the case may be) in a given institutional context (Schmidt 2008; 2010)ii. 
Particularly useful is the distinction made between internal ‘coordinative discourse’ amongst 
EU policy actors and ‘communicative discourse’ taking place between the public and EU 
policy actors externally (Schmidt 2005; see also Hay and Smith 2010). In this case, a framing 
analysis of the discourse produced by the Commission during the recent crisis period is 
applied (Goffman 1974). Framing refers to how particular issues and problems are 
represented. In Entmann’s classic definition to frame is ‘to select some aspects of perceived 
reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a 
particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment 
recommendation for the item described’ (1993:52). This necessarily involves a form of bias 
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in terms of prioritisation and including or excluding certain factors, as well as the constitution 
of agency. Policy framing refers to the representation of a particular problem/issue (in this 
case fiscal governance and monetary stability) and of a proposed solution to this: diagnostic 
and prognostic framing (De Ville and Orbie 2011). 
 
Ideational or ideological framing refers to the framing of broader ideas (Van Der Veen 2005). 
In this case, the core ideologies noted are neoliberalism and Keynesianism. The core tenet of 
neoliberalism is that economic activity should be determined by the market-based 
interactions of private individuals and companies rather than political institutions (Hayek 
1962): it explicitly limits the role of the state to that of ‘regulator’ rather than a ‘player’ in the 
economy. Keynesianism stemmed from the economic tenets of Keynes and affords the state a 
key role in the economy in bolstering demand and moderating booms (Skidelsky 1992:572-
624), and came to refer to a more interventionist approach to political economy in general. 
These are ideal type definitions and an institution such as the EU defies crude categorisation, 
but the dominance of neoliberalism within the EU and the Commission in particular has been 
noted (Anderson 2010; Holden 2015). A number of authors have also documented the 
entrenchment of neoliberal policy ideas within EMU, including a policy consensus over 
'sound money and public finances' as a central part of a resolute commitment to price stability 
(McNamara 1998; Marcussen 2000). As macroeconomic theories, neoliberalism and 
Keynesianism are not geared towards explaining integration preferences within EMU. 
However, in the context of the EU financial and economic crisis, Keynesianism demands 
inter-state fiscal solidarity, which strongly implies the kind of deep pooling of sovereignty 
associated with supranationalism. In contrast, an intergovernmental approach would be 
largely confined to reinforcing fiscal discipline under the pre-existing stability and growth 
pact (SGP) framework, in line with neoliberal principles. 
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In order to identify the possible frames and contrastive perspectives that are likely to figure in 
the Commission’s discourse on the financial and economic crisis, a wider review of the 
reform literature for EMU was completed (see the section below, ‘Crisis and Reform in EU 
Fiscal Governance’). Table 1 links the different problem and solution policy frames 
uncovered to two different integration scenarios for EMU (Intergovernmental and 
Supranational), as well as to the broader economic ideological frameworks already mentioned 
(neoliberalism and Keynesianism). Here different policies for EMU governance reform are 
framed by a particular structure of arguments concerning problems and solutions, which can 
be uncovered through a close linguistic analysis of text (see Locke 2004). In this case, 
individual frames are manifested by the existence or non-existence of key words, phrases and 
argumentative structures in the text. These categories can also be linked to patterns of 
reasoning that are guided by the core economic ideologies previously mentioned (Blyth 2002). 
With policy documents that are a reaction to moments of crisis, it can also be expected that 
there may be competing frames within texts. Therefore, a close examination of the different 
framing devices interacting within a text is necessary for uncovering the reform priorities of 
the Commission.   
 
In terms of timing, the analysis is focused around the framing activities that took place 
around the middle of 2012 as the reform debate turned to the more fundamental measures 
needed to fix EMUiii. A key contribution to this debate was the Commission report released 
in November 2012 setting out its future vision for a strong and stable EMU architecture 
entitled, A Blueprint for a deep and genuine economic and monetary union: Launching a 
European Debate. Public policy texts are complimented by speeches from Commission 
officials and 10 semi-structured interviews that were carried out between 2013 and 2014 with 
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senior members of DG ECFIN who participated directly in the major EMU reform 
deliberationsiv. The interview data allows the researcher to form a comparison between the 
official position of the Commission as set out in official discourse and what institutional 
elites’ reform priorities actually entail. In line with the typology used by Schmidt (2005), as 
well as Hay and Smith (2010), the public documents are a part of ‘communicative discourse’, 
—part of a political/rhetorical strategy— ,while the interviews offer samples of internal 
‘coordinative discourse’, the precise—often nuanced—views of individual elites.  
 
Following a framing analysis, the Commission will be placed in the wider ideational and 
institutional context within which it operates. Key here will be exploring the link between the 
dominant policy frames and the broader ideological underpinnings of EMU. The historical 
roots of the discursive environment will also be explored. At this juncture, historical 
institutionalism’s focus on concepts such as ‘path dependency’ and ‘critical junctures’ is 
useful for helping understand the ‘stickiness’ that characterises many aspects of EU policy-
making (Pierson 1996). Path dependency has been extensively discussed and analysed in 
relation to a number of policy issues and organisational situations (see amongst others Hall 
and Taylor 1996; March and Olsen 1999; Pierson 1996; Thelen and Steinmo 1992). However 
this approach is not deterministic, as there is room for departures from a particular pathway 
through ‘critical junctures’ or ‘moments’ when substantial institutional change takes place 
(Hall and Taylor 1996:942). In sum, by linking framing analysis with broader processes of 
ideational and institutional change, it offers a more fruitful explanatory framework from 
which to discuss the Commission’s role during the crisis. 
 
Crisis and Reform in EU Fiscal Governance 
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The intensification of the financial and economic crisis in Europe around the middle of 2010 
focused European policy-makers’ attention on the suitability of running a common currency 
characterised by a profound asymmetry between a centralised monetary policy and a 
decentralised fiscal policy (Verdun 1998). Faced with a crisis of potentially existential 
proportions, the EU institutions, led by President Herman Van Rompuy’s special Task Force, 
initiated legislative action in order to try and calm market forces. Chief amongst the reform 
initiatives implemented in the early stages of the crisis included an economic legislative ‘six-
pack’ (adopted December 2011), an intergovernmental ‘Euro Plus Pact’ (adopted in March 
2011) and finally a fiscal compact (an intergovernmental treaty adopted in March 2012) 
(Commission 2012). A defining characteristic of these early initiatives is that they were 
limited to building on the pre-existing Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) framework for fiscal 
discipline. Nevertheless, with market sentiment towards the Eurozone seen to be improving 
come the latter end of 2012 (owing largely to rhetoric and exceptional monetary policy 
actions taken by the European Central Bank (ECB) under the leadership of Mario Draghi), 
the attention of European leaders switched to the longer-term measures required to fix EMU. 
It is against this backdrop that there emerged at least the possibility for marked increases in 
fiscal integration.  
 
Support for a supranational model of fiscal integration can be traced back to the early 
scepticism amongst many economists concerning the viability of constructing a monetary 
union without accompanying mechanisms of fiscal solidarity (or transfer mechanisms) to 
offset asymmetric shocks within EMU (see amongst others Eichengreen 1990; Eichengreen 
and von Hagen 1996). Following the recent emergence of a chronic balance of payments 
crisis in Europe, with the core member states profiting from surpluses and the periphery 
member states enduring chronic deficits, there have been renewed calls for EMU to be 
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completed on the fiscal side (see De Grauwe 2013). The majority of the policy suggestions 
put forward with this goal in mind have revolved around the implementation of two neo-
Keynesian fiscal solidarity mechanisms: 1) debt mutualisation and financial risk sharing 
instruments; and 2) the development of an EU fiscal capacity with a mixture of redistributive 
and/or stabilisation functions. First, suggestions for commonly issued securities include the 
so-called European Safe Bonds (Euro-nomics group 2011), Eurobills-blue/red bond (Delpha 
and von Weizsäcker 2010) and Redemption bonds (Bofinger et al. 2011). Second, in terms of 
the development of a centralised fiscal capacity, a Bruegel Policy Contribution details the 
four main options for purposes of stabilisation of regional shocks within the euro area: 1) 
unemployment insurance; 2) payments related to deviations of output from potential; 3) the 
narrowing of large spreads; 4) and discretionary spending (Wolf 2012). Of course, the 
implementation of such far-reaching fiscal solidarity mechanisms within EMU would be 
dependent on significant transfers of sovereignty to the EU level in order to prevent negative 
spillover effects and guard against fears of moral hazard (IMF 2013). Fiscal policy and the 
ability to tax and spend are also highly salient in a political context and remains deeply rooted 
at the national parliamentary level in Europe. Consequently, the need to ensure democratic 
legitimisation is likely to be far stronger (Scarpf 2003). Deeper fiscal integration would 
therefore need to be matched by parallel steps towards the development of a flanking political 
union in order to address the ideas of democratic legitimacy and accountabilityv. 
 
The alternative to a supranational EMU can be labelled as the ‘intergovernmental model’ as it 
would preserve the fundamentally decentralised nature of fiscal policy making in Europe. In 
discussions, support for this model is often intertwined with a crisis narrative of fiscal 
profligacy, which places neoliberal ideas of fiscal discipline at the heart of any account of the 
crisis (von Hagen et al. 2009; 2011; Sinn 2010). The adoption of the government profligacy 
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explanation enables the resistance of supranationalism and discussions of European solidarity 
in favour of a more limited fiscal discipline agenda, which can be pursued through the pre-
existing legal framework. Here the main focus is restricted to measures building on, rather 
than replacing, the SGP framework for fiscal discipline. Moreover, the lack of a flanking 
political union capable of applying European-wide democratic standards would mean 
legitimacy and accountability mechanisms would remain largely indirect under this more 
limited model of integration (through national ministers and Heads of State or Government 
within the Council and European Council). 
 
With two distinct reform paths laid out for EU fiscal governance, it is possible to identify 
some of the key frames and contrasting perspectives that are likely to figure in the 
Commission reform discourse on the financial and economic crisis (see Table 1). A 
distinction is made between the diagnosis of the problem and the solution arrived to deal with 
the problem. Together the different framing strategies can be understood as supporting either 
an intergovernmental or supranational model of fiscal integration. Guiding the more limited 
intergovernmental model of reform is an intellectually simplified representation of the crisis 
as one resulting from fiscal profligacy amongst certain member states. Such a representation 
of the problem already implies a given solution in the form of strengthened neoliberal fiscal 
discipline, which can be secured by building on the pre-existing SGP framework. Framing 
the crisis in these terms may also be more politically expedient as it is not dependent on the 
prospect of challenging integration steps being taken in the direction of full fiscal and 
political union.  
 
Alternatively, the supranational model of reform is underpinned by a more comprehensive 
diagnosis of the crisis as a balance of payments problem, with a focus on both private and 
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public debt build-up. Here potential solutions are also not limited to strengthening fiscal 
disciple within EMU, but are instead framed in terms of completing fiscal integration within 
the asymmetric EMU framework. This is understood as demanding substantial debt 
mutualisation amongst member states and/or the development of an enlarged EU budget 
function in order to offset asymmetric shocks. At an ideational level, this framing strategy is 
underpinned by Keynesian ideas of fiscal solidarity between member states. Politically, the 
problem of ensuring sufficient channels of democratic legitimacy and accountability 
throughout the reform process is also problematised here. This is understood to demand the 
development of a flanking political union to accompany integration on the fiscal side. 
 
 
Table 1: The Framing of EU Fiscal Governance Reform (Please insert Table 1 here 
approximately). 
 
Fiscal Union Political Union  
Model of Fiscal 
Federalism 
 
 
 
 
 
Intergovernmental  
Reform Model 
 
The crisis is framed as a 
problem of Fiscal 
profligacy amongst certain 
member states. 
 
Reform solutions limited to 
strengthening neoliberal 
fiscal discipline within 
EMU through the 
implementation of reforms 
building on the rules-based 
SGP framework. 
 
 
Limited references to 
political reform. Relies on 
indirect legitimacy via 
representative of member 
states in the Council and 
European Council. 
 
 
Limited model of fiscal 
federalism: rules-based 
fiscal union with indirect 
channels of democratic 
legitimisation. 
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Framing the Eurozone Crisis  
 
Communicative Discourse  
 
In November 2012, the EU Commission released a communication setting out its future 
vision for a strong and stable EMU architecture entitled, A Blueprint for a deep and genuine 
economic and monetary union: Launching a European Debate. Within the blueprint, the 
Commission reframes the crisis as a problem of fiscal profligacy. For example, the 
Commission strongly links the onset of the crisis events with the ‘insufficient observance of 
and respect for the agreed rules underpinning EMU as laid down in the Stability and Growth 
Pact’ (European Commission 2012:2). This lack of compliance with the SGP framework by 
member states is understood as giving rise to ‘budgetary slippages during good times, and an 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Supranational  
Reform Model 
 
The crisis is framed as 
balance-of-payments 
problem resulting from the 
accumulation of private 
debt. 
 
Reform solutions centred on 
completing EMU by 
increasing neo-Keynesian 
fiscal solidarity 
mechanisms through debt 
mutualisation and/or the 
development of an enlarged 
EU budget function. 
 
Fiscal transfers understood 
as dependent on a 
centralisation of 
budgetary sovereignty at 
the European level. 
 
 
 
 
Problem of accompanying 
reform process with 
sufficient  channels of 
democratic legitimacy and 
accountability. 
 
Solution in the form of the 
development of a flanking 
political union aspect, via a 
strengthening of the 
European Parliament 
(alongside increased 
involvement of national 
parliaments). 
 
 
 
 
Far reaching model of 
fiscal federalism: full 
fiscal and political union. 
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inability to bring down the debt levels of highly indebted countries’ (European Commission 
2012:2). Fiscal profligacy and the failure to adhere to the SGP rules is therefore labelled as 
being ‘at the heart of the challenges faced by the euro area’, although the role of ‘financial 
markets’, ‘competitiveness gaps’, and ‘growth divergences’ are also highlighted as secondary 
challenges that need addressing (European Commission 2012: 2-3). 
 
As part of an earlier address in June 2011, the Commissioner responsible for Economic and 
Monetary Affairs and the Euro, Olli Rehn, was even more explicit in framing the crisis 
primarily as a fiscal problem arguing that,‘[T]he fundamental reason for the turbulence in the 
sovereign debt market is that there is no trust in the market that some member states do the 
necessary fiscal and structural reforms to service their debt’ (Rehn 2011). The following 
November, the same Commissioner reiterated that the fundamental causes of the crisis lie in 
the inadequate fiscal policies of certain member states:  
 
The financial crisis revealed certain systemic weaknesses in the EU's 
economic and monetary union. Many countries in the euro area did not use 
the opportunity of good times in the first decade of the euro to put their 
fiscal houses in order. When the crisis hit, it exposed those countries where 
imbalances were large and/or public finances were in a bad shape (Rehn 
2011a). 
 
In sum, the Commission repeatedly frames the crisis as the result of fiscal profligacy amongst 
certain member states. It is also notable that there is little reflection as to the possibility that 
the crisis may have originated from broader structural deficiencies inherent within the single 
currency area, related to the lack of a deeply integrated fiscal union. 
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With the crisis being re-framed in these terms, it is unsurprising that the immediate solutions 
advanced in the Blueprint for a Deep and Genuine EMU are limited to the implementation of 
intergovernmental fiscal discipline. For example, the Commission reaffirms its commitment 
to ‘budgetary discipline’ as an ‘essential safeguard of the stability of the euro area’ (European 
Commission 2012:14). It is then emphasised that ‘immediate priority’ should be given to the 
full deployment of the new economic governance tools brought by the ‘six-pack’, as well as 
the rapid adoption of current Commission proposals such as the ‘two-pack’ (European 
Commission 2012:12). This logic follows for the Commission as the legislative reforms 
introduced under the 'six-pack' and 'two-pack' are focused overwhelmingly on ‘strengthening 
the SGP framework for fiscal responsibility’ (European Commission 2013). 
 
As part of a May 2011 address, during the height of the negotiations on the ‘six-pack’, 
President Barroso had already sought to identify the strengthening of the SGP framework for 
fiscal discipline as a priority solution to overcoming the challenges revealed by the crisis: 
 
Europe has a set of rules in place to guarantee sound public finances—the 
Stability and Growth Pact. But these rules need to be respected, and so 
giving real teeth to the Pact is crucial. For, as we have seen, by not being 
effectively implemented or enforced, the Pact inevitably lost some 
credibility. Yet, we have now learned the hard way that excessive debt and 
public deficits in one Member State can damage the wider euro area and the 
European Union as a whole (Barroso 2011a). 
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In a similar vein, the following November, Commissioner Olli Rehn reiterated the importance 
of reinforcing rules-based fiscal discipline in order to cement what is termed a ‘stability 
culture’ in Europe: 
 
Now we must bring the stability culture to fiscal policy. We have made 
progress: new legislation to strengthen the Stability and Growth Pact 
proposed a year ago will enter into force shortly. It will allow us to tackle 
both fiscal and macro-economic imbalances of a Member State much 
earlier than has been the case (Rehn 2011). 
 
The Commissioner also left it in no doubt that that the EU executive ‘will present two 
proposals that bring further stability to fiscal policy of the euro area’ in order to underpin this 
so-called ‘national stability culture’ (Rehn 2011). In sum, the framing of solutions by the 
Commission for overcoming the immediate challenges posed by the crisis are largely limited 
to the implementation of intergovernmental fiscal discipline.  
 
However, over the medium to long-term, there is a shift in the Commission discourse within 
the blueprint towards a more supranational model of integration. This is in keeping with the 
Commission’s declaration that ‘steps towards more responsibility and economic discipline 
should be combined with more solidarity and financial support’ (European Commission 
2012:12). In accordance with these objectives, the blueprint proposes that a range of 
‘solidarity’ mechanisms be set up over an extended time period, including an autonomous 
‘fiscal capacity’ (or ‘federal budget’) for the euro area (European Commission 2012:31-32). 
This is also in keeping with Commission President Barroso’s 2012 State of the Union address 
where he argued that, to deliver lasting results, Europe needs a ‘fully equipped Community 
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economic governance together with a genuine, credible Community fiscal capacity’ (Barosso 
2012). In the blueprint, it is reasoned that such a fiscal capacity could eventually be set up on 
the basis of own resources and utilized to provide ‘targeted financial support for the Member 
States facing adjustment difficulties’. (European Commission 2012:25-26). Moreover, the 
possibility is also floated for permitting limited forms of ‘debt mutualisation’ over the long-
term in order to tackle the ‘excessive debt’ and ‘financial instability’ that has been triggered 
by the crisis (European Commission 2012:25-26). 
 
As would be expected, in the blueprint increased fiscal solidarity over the long-term is 
ultimately understood as being dependent on ‘the progressive pooling of sovereignty at the 
European level’ (European Commission 2012:12). In a speech in February 2013 Olli Rehn 
commented at more length on the necessity of rebuilding EMU in accordance with these twin 
ideas:   
In our view, the essential guiding principle must be that any step towards 
increased solidarity and mutualisation of economic risk be combined with 
increased responsibility and fiscal rigour: that is, with further sharing of 
sovereignty and deeper integration of decision-making within the eurozone 
(Rehn 2013). 
 
Following this logic, the blueprint offers three non-exclusive paths to be taken towards a 
centralisation of budgetary decision making including: 1) the full power of revision over 
national budgets; 2) tighter monitoring and coordination; and 3) the harmonisation of national 
budgetary laws (European Commission 2012:26-27). A guiding principle, then, is that 
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increased solidarity at the European level is met with further sovereignty transfers by member 
states and deeper fiscal integration within EMU.  
 
As a further reflection of the embedding of a supranational discourse over the long-term, 
there are also discussions within the blueprint concerning the development of a flanking 
‘political union’ to accompany integration on the fiscal side. At the heart of this framing 
device the Commission places the problem of ensuring the ‘democratic legitimacy and 
accountability of decision-making’ (European Commission 2012:35-41). Assuming a 
successful process of centralised fiscal integration over the long-term, the blueprint lays 
down as a solution the idea that ‘it is the European Parliament that primarily needs to ensure 
democratic accountability for any decisions taken at EU level (European Commission 
2012:35). This solution has clear supranational connotations: ‘A further strengthened role of 
EU institutions will therefore have to be accompanied with a commensurate involvement of 
the European Parliament in the EU procedures’ (European Commission 2012:35). However, 
the procedural details and the precise nature of the balance to be struck between the European 
and national level parliaments are left ambiguous.  
 
A level of ambiguity was also reflected in comments made by the President of the European 
Commission as part of his 2012 State of the Union speech when he referred to the need to 
move towards a ‘federation of nation states’: 
 
I call for a federation of nation states. Not a super-state. A democratic 
federation of nation states that can tackle our common problems, through 
the sharing of sovereignty in a way that each country and each citizen are 
better equipped to control their own destiny (Barosso 2012). 
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The idea is nebulous as a ‘federation of nation states’ does not address exactly in what 
manner competencies should be shared between the national and European level, although 
this Kantian concept is significant for its supranational implications. Of course, the 
undetermined nature of the discourse on political union is not unexpected given the 
complacency of the Commission regarding the mechanisms for securing democratic 
legitimacy and accountability under the current legal framework. Nevertheless, a 
commitment to political union, albeit loosely defined, is significant in that it is further 
evidence of the embedding of a supranational discourse over the long-term. 
 
Coordinative Discourse 
 
Overlapping with the communicative discourse, senior officials located in DG ECFIN have 
privately internalised framing strategies which emphasise intergovernmental fiscal discipline 
as the essential solution to the crisis. For example, one secretariat official defended the 
prioritisation of measures designed to strengthen the pre-existing SGP framework: 
 
The full implementation of the measures put forward by the ‘six-pack’ and 
the ‘two-pack’ is the correct priority for me...And now, at least in the fiscal 
area, the priority is implementation in order to see if all these new reforms 
strengthening the SGP instrument work well and that member states are 
convinced of the need to stick to them; that the Commission sticks to its 
role of pointing to the member states that do not do so; and to ensure that 
the new legislation is fully followed, let’s say (Secretariat Official in DG 
ECFIN 1 2013). 
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Equally, when commenting on the ‘six-pack’ and ‘two-pack’, a senior director remarked that: 
‘It is very important that these measures for reinforcing fiscal discipline within EMU are 
implemented for real and that all the players really take it seriously’ (Senior Director in DG 
ECFIN  2013).  
 
The framing of intergovernmental fiscal discipline as a priority solution to the crisis events 
that befall the euro area is also again seen to result from a simplification of the crisis problem 
as one resulting from fiscal profligacy. For example, one policy adviser rationalised just such 
a reading of the crisis: 
 
The focus, of course, in the first years of the crisis was on the preventative 
side. That means strengthening the fiscal rules of the SGP, which is logical. 
I mean that is where it went wrong right? That is why we got into this mess. 
So the natural response is to fix the gaps (Policy Adviser in DG ECFIN 
2013). 
 
In a similar vein, another senior fiscal policy advisor reasoned that, ‘the crisis has 
demonstrated clearly the need for these enhanced surveillance instruments’ (Senior Fiscal 
Policy Advisor in DG ECFIN 2013). Moreover, the same official also raised the prospect that 
‘maybe the Commission will need to consider additional proposals to strengthen fiscal 
surveillance further in the future’ (Senior Fiscal Policy Advisor in DG ECFIN 2013). One 
member of the secretariat was even more precise in their explanation that ‘the measures 
expected to come into force are good because we need to ensure that the events in Greece 
cannot be repeated’ (Secretariat official in DG ECFIN 2 2013). The official was also keen to 
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emphasise that, in the run up to the crisis, the ‘Commission was a bit too lenient with regard 
to certain member states’ (Secretariat official in DG ECFIN 2 2013). In terms of the 
immediate framing of the crisis, then, there is a high degree of overlap between the 
communicative discourse and the interview discourse from senior officials located in DG 
ECFIN. Both converge heavily in the short-term around intergovernmental fiscal discipline as 
the most immediate solution to the crisis, based on an understanding that profligacy caused 
the crisis. 
 
In terms of the framing of the crisis over the long-term, there is at this point a notable 
disconnect between the public communicative discourse and the private coordinative 
discourse internalised by officials located in DG ECFIN. The former tailored its reform 
discourse over time towards a growing emphasis on supranational solutions within EMU, 
with the language of fiscal solidarity, budgetary integration and sovereignty transfers 
becoming increasingly prominent. However, this language is noticeably absent in the 
interview discourse from officials located in DG ECFIN during the crisis. Instead, the 
officials express scepticism over both the desirability and political feasibility of employing 
supranational solutions in response to the crisis. One senior director touched on both these 
issues when discussing the potential for a fiscal capacity for the euro area or a substantial 
mutualisation of member states sovereign debt: 
 
Are they necessary now, in three years’ time or in five years’ time? Are we 
all going to die together if we do not have it? Probably not. I think everyone 
agrees now that all the political capital should be put towards banking union, 
which is sufficiently difficult (Senior Director in DG ECFIN 2013). 
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Similar sentiments over the desirability and political feasibility of such reforms were 
expressed by one policy advisor who made the distinction between what represents a ‘needs-
based and what we think is a profitable way of going towards a stable Union’ (Senior 
Director in DG ECFIN 2013). When applying this logic to the prospect of supranational 
integration within EMU the official was clear: ‘So I think while debt mutualisation and fiscal 
transfers could be profitable, I do not think it is absolutely necessary’ (Senior Director in DG 
ECFIN 2013).  
 
Again the remaining officials in DG ECFIN express similar doubts over both the desirability 
and political feasibility of employing supranational solutions to the crisis. For example, one 
senior fiscal policy advisor was noticeably ambivalent in their analysis: ‘I think there needs to 
be some ingredients of fiscal union. It’s not entirely clear which ones and to what extent; 
there are different views and these are tricky questions’ (Senior Fiscal Policy Advisor in DG 
ECFIN 2013). Likewise, when discussing the reforms required to stabilise EMU over the 
long-term, a separate official remarked that they were ‘reticent to have a full vision’ (Official 
in DG ECFIN 2013). This is because they reasoned ‘it’s not a pure economic decision—in 
that there is no right and wrong’ (Official in DG ECFIN 2013). Also, once again, the political 
difficulty of the reform process was alluded to:  
 
[I]f you just talk of a large budget we will not get anywhere, so what we 
need is to put down some stones in order to go in this direction—although 
the end result may not be entirely clear or entirely predetermined at the 
beginning of the process (Senior Fiscal Policy Advisor in DG ECFIN 
2013 ). 
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In sum, there is a reasonable degree of scepticism on the part of officials in DG ECFIN over 
both the desirability and, in particular, the political feasibility of advancing solutions 
involving deeper fiscal integration in Europe. This scepticism runs contrary to the emergent 
supranationalism within the Commission’s public framing of the crisis.  
 
Similar discrepancies between the communicative and coordinative discourse can be found 
when discussing possible integration steps towards a flanking ‘political union’ to accompany 
integration on the fiscal side. Here the interview discourse framed the strengthening of the 
European Parliament as a necessary measure in order to underpin the values of democratic 
legitimacy and accountability within the reform process. However, this supranational 
ambition for the European Parliament is not reflected by officials in DG ECFIN. For example, 
one senior director was only able to provoke more questions than answers when considering 
the possible institutional dynamics of any future political union with EMU: 
 
If a policy competency is moved to the European level, then it also has to 
be clear that this has been moved to the European level. And then, maybe, it 
is the European Parliament that could take on a role. Also, maybe experts 
could think of some kind of way to involve national parliaments—maybe a 
consultative role or something like this—but I do not know (Senior Director 
in DG ECFIN 2013).  
 
The same official was also keen to emphasise that any such discussions will be inherently 
tricky because of the political sensitivities involved here: ‘I think it is challenging to come to 
a clear specification because that implies political trade-offs and in the end someone has to 
give up something’ (Senior Director in DG ECFIN 2013). 
24 
 
 
One policy adviser was equally short on detail when asked what specific steps need to be 
taken in the future towards political union. They reasoned this is because ‘it depends entirely 
on the steps we take on the road to further fiscal integration’ (Policy Adviser in DG ECFIN, 
2013). When discussing this same topic, an official did clarify that the European Parliament 
would ‘want to play an enhanced role’—and they added that ‘it would be very difficult not to 
give it a role’ (Official in DG ECFIN, 2013). However, there was no clarity given as to 
whether this role would be limited to advisory or consultative powers or if alternatively the 
European Parliament would be given real legislative power over budgetary matters. Finally, 
one senior fiscal policy advisor questioned if the debate should be centred on the European 
Parliament at all: ‘So while I am happy to say democratic legitimacy and empower the 
parliament, I am worried about the executive. I think we need to think about having an 
executive that is really an executive in Europe’ (Senior Fiscal Policy Advisor 2013). In 
contrast to the public discourse, the interview discourse points towards only a limited 
ambition for progressing towards a more supranational political union. In fact, officials have 
at best a limited vision of how political integration should evolve in the future, and the whole 
concept is greeted with a high degree of scepticism. 
 
Policy Framing Environment 
 
How are these disparities between the different communicative and coordinative voices of the 
Commission to be understood? It is not a case of the tension between the bureaucratic and 
political elements of the institution (Nugent and Rhinard 2015), as both of the narratives 
discussed are inevitably political. Instead the Commissions framing activities must be placed 
in historical context and understood in terms of the wider interplay of institutions and ideas. 
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Firstly, the embedded ideational framework is clear. In the early 1980s, there was a shift in 
economic thinking amongst the monetary authorities of Europe away from Keynesianism in 
favour of neoliberalism and its early financial counterpart, ‘monetarism’ (McNamara 1998). 
In the context of European monetary integration, monetarism therefore became the dominant 
ideology from which to frame the workings of macroeconomic policy in the single currency 
area (De Grauwe 2007). Yet, while there emerged a strong consensus around monetary policy 
objectives during the negotiations leading up to the signing of the Maastricht treaty, the 
inevitable tension that would result within EMU between a centralized monetary policy and 
an essentially decentralized economic and fiscal policy remained largely ignored. As Verdun 
remarked, ‘fiscal policy harmonisation was just simply one step too far; there was no support 
for a transfer of sovereignty over these matters’ (1999:122). While political exigencies 
dictated that there would be no supranational fiscal authority in Europe, from the standpoint 
of aligning EMU with the neoliberal 'sound money and public finances' consensus, 
integration was not finished at Maastricht. Instead, the rules-based SGP of 1996, pushed for 
at Germany’s insistence, further institutionalised intergovernmental fiscal discipline as the 
bedrock of EMU. 
 
Following the initiative to create a single currency area, the trajectory of reform has been a 
highly path-dependent process (Heipertz and Verdun 2011). It was based on an ideational 
framework of neoliberalism, embedded in rules, institutional practises and legal norms, and 
was further consolidated by the geo-economic power of Germany. However, the 
intensification of the financial and economic crisis in Europe in 2010 onwards offered the 
prospect at least of a ‘critical juncture’ event from which new economic and political policy 
choices could originate for EMU (Pierson 1996). Yet a combination of ideational and 
institutional barriers to reform can be detailed which may have worked to discourage the 
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Commission from employing supranational framing strategies through its coordinative 
discourse. First, the Commission was acting in response to and experiencing what has been 
termed as a crisis of 'existential proportions’: an existential crisis for the Eurozone and the 
EU (as termed by an Advisor to the European Council President, 2014). Furthermore, the 
Commission was also forced to try and regain the political initiative at the regional level lost 
to the global financial markets, which were seen to move faster than the EU’s ability to react 
(De Grauwe and Yuemei 2013). In sum, the crisis environment posed considerable risks (e.g. 
contagion, sovereign default or disorderly exit), while at the same time exposing EU policy-
makers to unpredictable market forces. 
 
Functioning in this crisis environment, the Commission would have been under pressure to 
offer a quick diagnosis along with effective solutions to mitigate the financial and economic 
turmoil. This would have encouraged DG ECFIN officials privately to frame the crisis in a 
manner that is politically and intellectually easier. Certainly, framing the crisis problem as 
fiscal profligacy and pushing reform solutions limited to intergovernmental discipline was 
consistent with the current legal basis provided by the Maastricht treaty. Crucially, these 
policy frames also conformed strongly to the neoliberal ideational framework historically 
underpinning EMU governance. Furthermore, it was also as a reaction to the crisis events that 
intergovernmental decision making became of heightened importance (Puetter 2012). The 
Commission, then, was also faced with the risk of having its authority and traditional 
legislative role within EMU undermined by a resurgent European Council led by its newly 
appointed President Herman Van Rompuy. This would have only further intensified pressure 
within the Commission to act strategically by framing the crisis privately in ways which are 
less challenging both politically and intellectually. 
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DG ECFIN officials were also faced with the political difficulty of overcoming the 
substantial differences of opinion amongst member states in a policy area that remains deeply 
rooted at the national level. As one senior director in DG ECFIN remarked: 
 
Of course, some people take the view that fiscal transfers or a significant 
mutualisation of debt are necessary to stabilise the debt situation of 
periphery member states. Yet everyone knows that these measures would 
require significant transfers of sovereignty of the sort that a number of 
states, including France, would outright object to. Also Chancellor Merkel 
is firmly opposed to large sums of money being transferred to the periphery. 
These are major obstacles; it is the reality we face (Senior Director in DG 
ECFIN 2013). 
 
In view of existing tensions amongst member states over sovereignty concerns and issues of 
moral hazard, such caution is understandable. Of course, deep fiscal integration was also 
made more politically challenging for the Commission to secure by the well-publicised lack 
of desire amongst member states to push for changes to the treaties. Again, the lack of 
support for a revision of the treaties amongst member states across Europe was a topic 
highlighted: 
 
I think that initially there was some muted support for treaty change 
amongst European leaders. However, as the crisis has progressed, it is 
becoming clearer that a revision of the treaties may be out of reach for the 
foreseeable future. This means that there are limits to how far reform can be 
progressed (Official in DG ECFIN 2013). 
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Given the shrinking political support amongst member states to push for amendments to the 
treaties, it leaves the scope of the existing reform agenda largely restricted to the revision of 
secondary legislation. Together, given the constraining discourses amongst member states 
and the lack of desire within the European Council to secure treaty change, the Commission 
officials would have been further discouraged from internalising a supranational reform 
agenda.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Since the intensification of the financial and economic crisis in Europe, the Commission has 
worked hard to ensure it that it has been a position to influence the emerging EU fiscal 
governance reform debate. However, operating in a situation of crisis and faced with a 
significant shift towards more intergovernmental modes of governance within EMU, the 
Commission acted strategically to frame the crisis around intergovernmental fiscal discipline. 
Framing the crisis in these terms was politically easier to formulate as such measures could 
be secured under the pre-existing SGP framework. Moreover, these policy frames conformed 
ideationally with the historically embedded neoliberal consensus within EMU. While there 
was an emergent supranationalism in the communicative discourse of the Commission over 
the longer-term, this element was found not to have been internalised in the coordinative 
discourse by officials in DG ECFIN. This was because offering supranational solutions to the 
crisis would have been politically high risk in view of the path-dependencies characteristic of 
the policy area, the significant constraining discourses amongst member states, as well as 
their strong lack of desire to explore treaty change as an option. Instead, supranational 
framing devices acted more as a discursive strategy to mask a crisis response that at its heart 
is concerned with implementing intergovernmental fiscal discipline.  
29 
 
 
In terms of the literature, these findings suggest that supranational institutions themselves 
may not be as hard-wired towards supranationalism or centralisation as was often assumed 
(see Pollack 2003). Instead, the Commission’s response to the crisis was more in line with the 
key hypothesis laid down by the new intergovernmentalism, which expects supranational 
actors to behave ‘strategically’ in accordance with their environment (Bickerton et al. 2015). 
Indeed, in framing the crisis, the Commission firmly shunned idealism in favour of a strategy 
that was both politically and intellectually feasible. Moreover, by formulating a practical 
crisis response, the Commission also pursued a strategy that would best preserve its power 
and influence at a time when the political centre of gravity has shifted further towards 
intergovernmental institutions. In terms of broader findings, this article also helped develop a 
deeper understanding of the ideational and institutional forces preventing an edging towards 
supranationalism within EMU. Of course, the major implication here is that the current 
integration phase will yield, at best, incremental reform; thus, implying that many of the 
major structural deficiencies within EMU present before the crisis may not be corrected. 
However, more research needs to be conducted into exploring the roots of the current 
impasse in European integration as well as the long-term sustainability of running an 
asymmetrical single currency area. 
                                                          
Notes 
iThis undertaking will also be pursued with the aid of a selection of theoretically informed 
ideas drawn from ‘historical institutionalism’ (Hall and Taylor 1996; Pierson 1996; March 
and Olsen 1999). 
ii The broader ontology here is based on a form of historical realism (Howell 2013). 
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iiiSee the remarks made by the President of the European Council following a meeting of EU 
leaders at the end of June 2012 where the prospect for a ‘longer-term’ reform vision for EMU 
was set out (Van Rompuy 2012). 
iv  Additional interviews with senior officials located in the European Council, ECOFIN 
Council and Eurogroup were also carried out during this same period.  
vThis follows in the tradition of, ‘no taxation without democratic representation’. 
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